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Abstract:  
Why do states accept what appears to be disproportionate and inequitable burdens in the 
provision of international collective goods?  Traditional burdens-sharing models emphasise 
free-riding opportunities of small countries at the expense of larger ones.  An alternative 
model suggests that countries specialise according to their comparative advantage as to the 
type and level of contribution they make to international collective goods.  We apply this 
model to forced migration and suggest that countries can contribute to refugee protection in 
two principal ways: proactively, through peace-keeping/making and reactively, by providing 
protection for displaced persons.  While the existing literature on peace-keeping provides 
evidence for the 'exploitation of the big by the small', our analysis of UNHCR data on 15 
OECD countries for the period 1994-2002 balances this view by showing that reactive 
burdens are disproportionately borne by smaller states.  We also show that EU asylum policy 
initiatives aimed at refugee burden-sharing aim at equalising particular dimensions of states' 
contributions to refugee protection.  By doing so, they might opportunities for specialisation 
and risk consolidating a sub-optimal provision of international refugee protection. 
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Why States Don’t Defect: 
Refugee Protection and Implicit Burden-Sharing 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The efforts made by countries to provide international collective goods often appear 
to be highly inequitable.  Burden-sharing debates have long been prevalent in areas 
such as international security, defence and peace-keeping, but are becoming 
increasingly important in areas such as climate change and refugee protection (Olson 
and Zeckhauser 1966; Oneal 1990a, 1990b; Sandler 1992).  What is surprising is not 
so much that some countries appear to be carry disproportionate burdens in providing 
for collective goods but that these inequitable distributions appear stable over time, 
with states accepting or being unable to change the pattern of burden-distribution.  
The question why some states put up with bearing larger burdens in the provision of 
collective goods has sparked strong academic interest.  There are different ways one 
can think about the observed stability of unequal burdens and the provision of 
collective goods.
1  The dominant view in the theoretical literature of alliances is that 
of Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). The key insight of this work is that larger countries 
are exploited by small countries in the provision of collective goods- the latter free-
ride on the commitments of the former.  Boyer (1989) presents an alternative view 
based on the idea that countries have a comparative advantage in providing certain 
types of collective goods over others.  One implication of  Boyer’s argument is that, 
whilst we may see evidence of the “exploitation hypothesis” on some dimension of 
collective goods provision, the overall picture may be less inequitable.   
 
The paper outlines these different theoretical frameworks for assessing burden-
sharing and analyses their applicability in the case of forced migration an area which 
                                                 
1 The goods and services that governments provide in the common interest of all individuals are often 
called collective or public goods.  Such goods are assumed to have to one or both of the following 
characteristics: (1) non-excludability: if the collective good is provided for, everyone automatically 
benefits, or, in others words, non-contributors cannot be kept from benefiting from that good, and (2) 
non-rivalry: if the good is available to any one person/state, it is available to others at little or no 
additional cost.   
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has received little attention in the burden-sharing literature.
2  Developing Boyer’s 
argument we consider that there are a number of ways in which countries can 
contribute to the provision of refugee protection.
3 We think of pro-active measures, 
such as sending peace-keeping troops to a region in order to prevent or contain forced 
migration, as attempts to stop an escalation of a potential refugee problem. We think 
of reactive measures, such as admitting protection seekers to a territory, as attempts to 
deal with the consequences of the refugee problem once it has occurred.   
 
Thinking about the problem in this way allows us to reassess some recent empirical 
findings offered by the burden-sharing literature (in particular Shimizu and Sandler 
2002).  In their analysis of  peace-keeping commitments they find evidence that larger 
countries contribute a disproportionate number of troops, thus indicating support for 
the “exploitation” hypothesis. We balance this view, by looking at the acceptance of 
asylum seekers within a state’s borders.  Using UNHCR data on 15 OECD countries 
for the period 1994-2002 we find that a disproportionate asylum and refugee burden is 
borne by smaller states.  
 
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
 
For a collectively provided good, countries receive benefits through the overall supply 
of the good which is a combination of their own contribution and that of others. Olson 
and Zeckhauser (1966) suggest that the burden for the provision of collective goods 
will be shared unevenly among states. Each country allocates some  of its income 
                                                 
2 The adoption of this terminology in the context of forced migration is of course not unproblematic.  
However, despite its potentially prejudicial connotation in a human rights context in which one might 
wish the language of costs and benefits to be absent, the term ‘burden-sharing ’is used here to reflect 
the way the debate about the perceived and real inequalities in the distribution of displaced persons and 
refugees has been conducted in Europe over recent years.  Attempts to replace the term in this area with 
a call for responsibility-sharing or the ‘equal balance of efforts ’between the Member States have had 
little impact on the way the public debate has been led. 
3 A word on the terminology used in this paper.  The term “refugee” is used here in its broadest sense 
to characterize individuals who have left their country in the belief that they cannot or should not return 
to it in the near future, although they might hope to do so if conditions permit.  In this usage, the 
category includes those recognised under the Geneva Convention but also those who have applied for 
refugee (or a subsidiary) protection status.  We use the terms displaced persons, forced migrants and 
protection seekers as interchangeably with the term refugee.  We take the term asylum seeker to refer 
to persons who move across international borders in search of protection or who have applied for 
protection as a refugee under the 1951 Geneva Convention and are awaiting the determination of their 
status.  We use the term Geneva Convention refugee for persons who have been granted protection 
under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.     4
toward the supply of the public good. By definition of a public good, no other country 
can be excluded from benefiting from this contribution nor does consumption of the 
public good reduce the amount available for consumption by others. In the 
representation by Olson and Arce (2004), countries also allocate income to the 
purchase of a private good which is consumed only by its own citizens.
4 The solution 
to this problem entails each country choosing an optimal level of contribution to the 
public good subject to its budget constraint. Some countries will choose to make no 
contribution at all. These countries can fill their requirement entirely from the 
contributions of other countries. Non contributors, who free-ride on the contributions 
of other countries, are thus free to spend their income on the private good.  As shown 
formally by Olson and Arce (2004), in the case of a non-zero level of contribution the 
actual contribution made is increasing in a country’s income. Thus, all in all, countries 
with a larger income bear a larger proportional share of the burden. This is what Olsen 
calls the ‘exploitation of the big by the small’ (1965: 29). As a result of such free-
riding opportunities, output for such collective goods will be at sub-optimal levels.
5  
Some writers have offered extensions to this model.  They argue that pure collective 
goods are a rare phenomenon. The extent of free-riding is dependent on the degree of 
publicness of the good in question (Sandler 1977; Sandler and Forbes 1980; Sandler 
and Hartley 2001).  For instance, in the defence context an ally might build up its 
arsenal not only to enhance regional security but also to maintain control over 
colonies, use defence procurement as a form of regional aid that guarantees 
employment, or maintain a large army for status enhancement.  In this context, public 
benefits accrue to the nation's population, but there is little, if any, spill over to the 
nation's ally.  Such benefits are thus excludable and rival among allies and hence 
partly private (or impurely public).  According to the 'joint product model' developed 
on the basis of these considerations, defence spending can be purely public, purely 
private or impurely public among allies (Sandler 1992: 459). 
 
A number of empirical studies in the area of collective defense have analysed the 
correlation of defense spending and Gross National Product and have offered support 
for the ‘exploitation hypothesis’ in the NATO context.  These studies (Olson and 
Zeckhauser, Oneal 1990a, 1990b; Sandler and Hartley 1999, 2001; Hartley and 
                                                 
4 This private good may of course be a public good at the national level. 
5 For limitations and inconsistencies with this general argument see Boyer (1989: 715).   5
Sandler 1999) have shown that for decades the United States and other large NATO 
Member States, have contributed a disproportionately large share of the burden to 
NATO’s collective defense effort and that resource allocation has remained below 
pareto-optimal levels. 
 
An alternative framework to explain international burden-sharing is proposed by 
Boyer (1989) who focuses on trade in public goods, building on the Ricardian theory 
of comparative advantage (see also Wong 1991).  This model  broadens the scope of 
analyses of security burden-sharing within the Western alliance system beyond the 
narrow military approach taken by the Olsen and Zeckhauser framework.  In contrast 
to that work, Boyer’s analysis  opens up the possibility of international burden-
sharing across issue areas.  Boyer hypothesises that states will specialize in the 
production of those collective goods (economic, political and military) for which they 
possess a comparative advantage. Such specialisation allows implicit trades to be 
made. One country which has a comparative advantage in one area of public goods 
provision can trade with a country with a comparative advantage in another area of 
provision. Thus higher expenditure by a country in an area of collective provision 
where it has a comparative advantage will be matched by lower expenditures in areas 
where it has no such advantage.  
 
Of course it is likely that, if one looks across enough issue dimensions, one will find 
issue dimensions where contributions correlate negatively. However, the illustrative 
example used in Boyer’s paper is revealing. He shows that countries which spend 
disproportionate amounts on military defence tend to 'under-spend' with regard to 
foreign aid.  From this Boyer suggests that countries specialise by contributing to 
international peace and stability either primarily through military expenditure or 
through foreign aid payments.  Military expenditure and foreign aid can thus be seen 
as substitutes. If Boyer is correct, focussing on one dimension of international security 
by assessing the optimality of alliance contribution only in military terms misses 
important aspects of the overall picture. Other forms of non-military security 
contributions made by members of the alliance should be taken into account when 
analysing disparities in international security burdens.    
   6
The  'policy trade model' shows how cross-issue burden sharing might develop among 
allies, and more generally, how burdens might be shared among members of any 
group dealing with multiple public goods.  In contrast to the predictions made by free-
riding models, size discrepancies in the context of the multiple public goods setting 
will not necessarily lead to the free-rider behaviour hypothesised by Olson and 
Zeckhauser (1966).  There is no general incentive for the small to exploit the large. 
Small nations may well make contributions to the alliance effort that are 
commensurate to their size and in accordance with the comparative advantages they 
possess in the production of certain goods.    Moreover, Boyer’s model has important 
policy implications. The effects of trade are welfare enhancing. Any attempt to 
equalise burdens in specific burden categories thus acts as a form of regulation which 
curtails specialisation and therefore undermine countries' comparative advantage.   
This will, of course, lead to a reduction in overall contributions.  The following 
section will examine to what extent these two models can help to explain the extent 
and stability of apparent burden disparities in the context of refugee protection. 
 
Explaining Refugee Burden-Sharing 
 
There has been increasing dissatisfaction with the system of international refugee 
protection which, in the eyes of some, suffers from substantial burden-sharing 
problems (Barutciski and Suhrke 2001; Fonteyne 1983; Noll 1997; Hathaway 1997; 
Schuck 1997).  Some states appear to be bearing an inequitable share of the burden of 
international refugee protection, with some countries granting protection to a 
disproportionately large number of displaced persons in relation to other states (see 
table below).  Similar to the NATO burden-sharing debate, there has been (albeit 
more muted) protest and free-riding accusations from the main receiving countries as 
well as threats by some states to opt out of the 1951 Geneva Convention for the 
Protection of Refugees to which all OECD countries are signatories. A number of 
scholars, most prominently Suhrke (1998), have suggested that refugee protection has 
important ‘public good’ characteristics. Suhrke argues that the reception of displaced 
persons can be regarded an international public good from which all states benefit.  In 
her view, increased security can be regarded as the principal benefit, as an   7
accommodation of displaced persons can be expected to reduce the risk of them 
fuelling and spreading the conflict they are fleeing from.   
 
It is interesting to see then whether the pattern of provision in the field of refugee 
protection fits with the theories of public goods provision outlined above.  Building 
on  Boyer’s (1989) ideas  we suggest that the provision for a collective good can be 
broken down into tradable components.  In the refugee protection context, one 
feasible component is the provision of protection opportunities for displaced persons. 
We call this a reactive contribution since it deals with the problem once people have 
already been displaced.  Other forms of contribution such as engagement in unilateral 
and multilateral peace-keeping/making operations are termed proactive contributions 
since they aim to prevent refugee flows before they occur. Peace-
keeping/enforcement can be viewed as an alternative way to contribute to security by 
preventing or limiting uncontrolled population flows.  Like the acceptance of 
displaced persons, peacekeeping also possesses key elements of an international 
public good.  If intrastate and interstate conflicts have negative consequences on other 
countries in terms of unchecked migration flows, then peacekeeping efforts to end 
such wars represent a trans-national public good.  The peace and security provided by 
keeping migration flows in check through peacekeeping/making operations thus give 
rise to non-excludable and non-rival benefits. 
 
An empirical analysis of peacekeeping burden-sharing for the period 1994-2000 
confirms that (having adjusted for countries’ ability to pay) there is some evidence of 
peacekeeping burdens being shouldered disproportionately by large countries 
(Shimizu and Sandler 2002).6  Their study analyses two sets of countries: NATO 
allies and a broader sample of supporters of peacekeeping missions and covers both 
UN-led peacekeeping missions and also non-UN-led missions (for example the 
Implementation Force in Bosnia, the Kosovo Forces).  They conclude that the post-
Cold War years of large peacekeeping efforts imply that the larger countries are 
carrying more of the burden of these operations.  This suggests a return to an era of 
hegemony, where the hegemons are the USA and some wealthy EU nations.  If 
peacekeeping continues to increase in importance, then it is anticipated that this trend 
                                                 
6 See Jyoti, Sandler and Shimizu (1998) for the period 1976-1996.   8
toward disproportionate burden-sharing will increase (Shimizu and Sandler 2002: 
663-4).  
 
One might then ask, is similar evidence available when analysing the refugee burden?  
It is generally accepted that some countries more generously provide refuge for 
refugees that others, despite the fact that the international legal obligations are the 
same for the 141 signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of 
Refugees.  The Refugee Convention and its accompanying 1967 Protocol, form the 
foundation of the modern international legal system designed to protect people who 
flee their countries for reasons such as their political or religious beliefs, or 
membership of a particular ethnic or social group.7  Two principal obligations on 
signatory states can be identified.  First, allowing a displaced person to apply for 
asylum in order to gain refugee status under the Convention. Second, the obligation of 
‘non-refoulement’, i.e. the prohibition not to return refugees in any manner 
whatsoever to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened. 
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 below presents UNHCR data on the absolute number of 
asylum applications and resettled refugees
8 for 15 OECD countries for the period 
1994-2002.  Columns 3 and 4 present countries’ relative burdens on the basis of 
asylum applications received and resettlement cases accepted (controlling for 
different population size of host countries).  Switzerland, the Netherlands and 
Belgium have had the largest relative numbers of asylum applications over that 
period, while Australia, Canada and Norway accepted the largest number of resettled 
refugees relative to their population size.  States have a substantial degree of 
discretion in how they deal with asylum seekers on their territory.  They generally 
                                                 
7 According to the official text, the Convention applies to people who ‘owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’ 
8 While asylum seekers tend to arrive 'spontaneously' in a host country to file an application for Geneva 
refugee status, resettled refugees are those whose determination process has been conduced, usually 
through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) place in their region of origin 
and for whom host countries have expressed their willingness to the UNHCR to accept the resettlement 
of these refugees to their territory.  Whereas in the case of asylum seekers, states have only limited 
control as to the numbers of asylum seekers they might have to deal with at any particular point in time 
on the basis of their obligation under the Geneva Convention, states are in full control as to how many 
resettled refugees they accept.   9
three options: (1) Recognising their asylum claims, i.e. granting them refugee status 
under the Geneva Convention; (2) giving them some other protection status (such as 
‘exceptional leave to remain’) that allows them to legally live and (usually) work in 
the country, and (3) to reject an asylum claim and send the applicant back to their 
home country.
9  Column 6 in the table shows a substantial degree of variation in 
states’ willingness to award asylum-seekers in their territory some form of temporary 
or permanent protection status (Convention or subsidiary protection status).  On 
average, the Netherlands, Denmark and Canada been the most generous host 
countries, while Japan, Germany and Australia were the toughest countries when 
handling requests for protection.  
 
It is of course much easier for a country with small relative asylum inflows to operate 
a generous determination process than it is for a country faced with large inflows.  
Indeed previous studies have shown an inverse relationship between asylum 
applications and recognition rates (Neumayer 2005).  Column 7 provides an 
approximation of host countries’ willingness to accept burdens resulting from 
'spontaneous' refugees (i.e. non-resettlement refugees) by combining the relative 
number of asylum applications they have received with countries’ average recognition 
rates.  The results reported in that column suggest that (relative to their population 
size) Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark are on the top of the list of countries 
which have disproportionately contributed to refugee protection by accepting 
displaced persons in their territory, while Japan, Spain and Italy have contributed least 
in this way.  Some countries with relatively small numbers of 'spontaneous' asylum 
applications take in considerable numbers of resettled refugees under a system 
whereby refugees with a particularly urgent or intractable problem in their first 
                                                 
9 The question who actually gets recognized as a refugee is still a real issue among the EU Member 
States. The premise is often that an applicant will have the same chance of finding protection as a 
refugee in all EU countries. But this is not the case. In the Slovak Republic, for example, many of the 
asylum seekers are Chechens – a group that, for good reason, has a recognition rate of well over 50 
percent in several EU countries – yet by 30 September 2004 only two people had been granted asylum 
in the Slovak Republic out of 1,081 cases examined that year. In Greece, even when Saddam Hussein 
was still in power, less than 1 percent of Iraqi applicants were given refugee status, and the overall 
recognition rate fell last year to 0.6 per cent. It is not surprising that many asylum seekers move to 
countries where they think they have a better chance of having their claims recognized.  Ruud Lubbers 
(2004) EU should share asylum responsibilities, not shift them, UNHCR News, 5 November, 2004.  In 
a recent speech Lubbers stressed: ‘We need to improve the quality and consistency in asylum decision-
making in Europe. It seems unacceptable to me that the same asylum seeker – a Chechen for example – 
has virtually zero chance of finding protection in one Member State, a 50% chance in another and close 
to 100% in a third. ‘United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Ruud Lubbers, Talking 
Points for the Informal Justice and Home Affairs Council (Luxembourg, 29 January 2005).     10
asylum country are transported to a another third country.
10  Taking account of both 
'spontaneous' and resettlement inflows, Column 8 presents a ranking of average 
accepted protection burdens.  When comparing the rankings in column 7 (spontaneous 
only) and column 8 (including resettlement), one sees that the inclusion of 
resettlement figures does make some difference in the relative ranking of some 
countries such as Norway, Canada and Australia without changing the overall picture 
significantly.  While the rankings arrived here can be criticised on a number of 
grounds, not least the comparability of figures that national authorities report to the 
UNHCR, they do arguably give a burden approximation (with countries such as 
Netherlands and Switzerland at the top and Japan at the bottom) which appears to be 
broadly in line with the intuition of experts in the field.   
 
 
Table 1: Average Accepted Protection Burden (1994-2002) 
 
 
4 7  8 
   1 
2 
3  (1)/(3)*1000 
5 
6  (4)*(6) (5)+(7) 
Country 
Average 
annual 
number of 
asylum 
applications* 
Average 
resettlement 
arrivals 
Average 
population 
size 
(thousands) 
Average 
Number of 
Asylum 
Applications 
(per 1000 of 
population) 
Average 
Number of 
resettlement 
arrivals (per 
1000 of 
population) 
Average 
Recognition 
Rate (in 
percent)** 
Average 
Accepted 
Protection 
Burden 
(spontaneous 
arrivals) 
Average 
Accepted 
Protection 
Burden 
(spontaneous 
arrivals & 
resettlement) 
Netherlands 35345 
308 
15735  2.2 
0.020 
62.7  1.379  1.399 
Switzerland  25208 
   7131 
3.5 
0.000 
39.3  1.376  1.376 
Denmark 8312 
1034 
5297  1.6 
0.195 
61.6  0.986  1.181 
Sweden  15556 
1945  8855 
1.8 
0.220 
45.1  0.812  1.031 
Norway 7836 
1494 
4435  1.8 
0.337 
35  0.630  0.967 
Canada 29755 
10898 
30214  1 
0.361 
59.8  0.598  0.959 
Belgium 21532 
  
10212  2.1 
0.000 
32.3  0.678  0.678 
Australia 9086 
10222 
18740  0.5 
0.545 
18.1  0.091  0.636 
United States  75484 
76243 
272181  0.3 
0.280 
29.7  0.089  0.369 
                                                 
10 It has often been emphasised, that the traditional "countries of immigration" (Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the United States) offered resettlement places for up to 100,000 refugees in 2004, whereas 
Europe as a whole only made 4,700 places available.  United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Mr. Ruud Lubbers, Talking Points for the Informal Justice and Home Affairs Council 
(Luxembourg, 29 January 2005)   11
United 
Kingdom  61077 
39 
59040  1 
0.001 
36.1  0.361  0.362 
Germany 100844 
  
82002  1.2 
0.000 
15.7  0.188  0.188 
France 30595 
  
58481  0.5 
0.000 
18.4  0.092  0.092 
Italy 9223 
  
57029  0.2 
0.000 
24.6  0.049  0.049 
Spain 7352 
  
39669  0.2 
0.000 
24  0.048  0.048 
Japan 187 
162 
126383  0 
0.001 
13.5  0.000  0.001 
 
* Figures generally refer to the number of persons who applied for asylum. The figures used here are 
generally first instance ("new") applications only.  Source: Governments, UNHCR. Compiled by 
UNHCR (Population Data Unit). See also: http://www.unhcr.ch (Statistics). 
** Total recognition rates in industrialised countries (first instance).  Includes persons recognized 
(under Geneva Convention) and those ‘allowed to remain’ (on the basis of subsidiary protection) 
divided by the total of recognized, allowed to remain and rejected.  Source: UNHCR Statistical 
Yearbooks. 
 
 
 
We present these figures in a bar graph in Figure 1 below where, on the x-axis, we 
have arranged the countries according to GNP in ascending order.  There appears to 
be no evidence of a systematic exploitation of the big by the small as expected by the 
Olson and Zeckhauser model.  Quite on the contrary, we find that larger contributions 
tend to be made by the smaller countries such as the Scandinavian and  Benelux 
countries. By contrast, much smaller contributions are made by the larger countries 
such as the US, Japan, Germany, France and Italy.  
 
Figure 1: Average Accepted Protection Burden (by ascending GNP size), 1994-2002   12
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One reason why the Olson and Zeckhauser model does not explain the variation we 
observe may have to do with the characteristics of refugee protection as a collective 
good. It seems reasonable to assume that one country’s efforts in the area of refugee 
protection will have some positive spill over effects to other countries in the region.  
However, an important requirement of the ‘exploitation hypothesis’ is that the 
collective good analysed must have strong ‘non-private’ characteristics.  As discussed 
above, a public good is defined by its properties of non-excludability and non-rivalry. 
It is these properties which set it apart from a private good. The provision of a public 
good, such as the additional security provided by refugee protection, benefits not only 
countries which contribute to the protection of displaced persons but these benefits are 
also extended to other actors at no marginal cost.  However, refugee protection 
arguably, provides a spectrum of outputs ranging from purely public to private or 
country-specific outputs. This means that refugee protection provides more than the 
single output of ‘security’ implied by the pure public goods model: it also provides 
country specific benefits such as status enhancement or the achievement of 
ideological goals (such as when West during the cold war was keen to accept political 
refugees from behind the Iron Curtain).  In other words what is often regarded as a 
public good has in fact excludable (private) benefits to a country.  Moreover, we can   13
also expect relatively more benefits from refugee protection measures accruing to 
countries closer to a refugee generating conflict .   
 
The ‘joint product model’ suggests that a country’s contributions to the provision of 
refugee protection (with its public and private characteristics) will be positively 
related to the proportion of excludable benefits accruing to that country.  However, 
empirical tests of this in the area of refugee protection have produced mixed results.  
During the Kosovo conflict, Greek sensibilities concerning its Macedonian minority 
meant that Greece accepted a lot fewer Kosovo refugees than one would have 
expected on the basis of geographic proximity.  Other studies have shown that states’ 
willingness to shoulder protection burdens are positively correlated with their relative 
commitment to the norm of solidarity with people in need and that countries which 
accept a disproportionate number of protection seekers are also the ones with strong 
domestic redistribution (extensive welfare states) and above average foreign aid 
contributions (Thielemann 2003a). 
 
Whether the existence of private benefits and variation in host countries’ commitment 
to human rights can fully explain disparities in this area, remains somewhat 
questionable, given the scale and apparent stability of disparities we could observe 
above.  What we can say however is that , whilst empirical evidence suggests that in 
the area of peace-keeping the larger countries are being exploited by the small, no 
such picture emerges when analysing the asylum-burden.  In fact, the evidence 
suggests that in this regard it is the small who are being exploited by the large. It is 
tempting then to suggest that larger countries should accept a larger burden when it 
comes to the protection of asylum-seekers. Indeed, as will be shown below, this 
sentiment is clearly expressed in recent European policy initiatives aimed at tackling 
the issue of inequitable burdens in this policy area.  
 
European Refugee Burden-Sharing Initiatives 
 
At least since the Bosnian war refugee burden-sharing has been an issue for EU policy 
makers.  Public attention was first drawn to this in 1992 when Germany received over 
438.000 asylum applications, which constituted 66 percent of all applications   14
registered in the territory which now make up the European Union.11  Since then, the 
EU has developed ambitions for a more ‘equitable balance of efforts’ in this area.  
These ambitions for a more comprehensive EU burden-sharing system in this area 
were made most explicit in the text of the Amsterdam Treaty of October 1997, Article 
63 (ex 73k) of which states that the Council shall adopt measures ‘promoting a 
balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences 
of receiving refugees and displaced persons’.  In other EU documents we find even 
more concrete calls for solidarity and fairness in this area.  A recent Commission 
document states that ‘the implementation of such a [EU asylum] policy should be 
based on solidarity between member States and requires the existence of mechanisms 
intended to promote a balance in the efforts made by the Member States in receiving 
and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons’.  As a 
result of such pledges, there have been numerous European burden-sharing initiatives 
in this area.  Following Noll ’s (2000) categorization, there are essentially three ways 
to address the unequal distribution of protection seekers that states are faced with: (1) 
financial burden-sharing (sharing money), (2) physical burden-sharing (sharing 
people) and (3) harmonizing of asylum legislation (sharing policy).  Concrete EU 
efforts in each of these three areas will be analysed in more detail below.
12  In each 
case it will be asked to what extent these initiatives have been effective in achieving a 
more equitable distribution of burdens in this area. 
 
Sharing Money 
One way to address disparities is through the payment of financial compensation to 
the most popular destination countries.  In the EU, explicit financial burden-sharing in 
this area has been taking place since the establishment of the European Refugee Fund 
(ERF) which was put in place to support and encourage efforts of the Member States 
in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced 
persons (for an in depth analysis, see Thielemann 2005).  The Fund owes its origin to 
the Council meeting of Justice and Home Affairs ministers in Tampere in October 
1999, which called for the establishment of a financial reserve for the implementation 
of emergency measures to provide temporary protection in the event of a mass influx 
of protection seekers (European Council 2000).  The resulting Council Decision of 28 
                                                 
11 Figures provided in the UNHCR's Statistical Yearbook. 
12 Parts of this overview are based on Thielemann (2003).   15
September 2000 established the European Refugee Fund (ERF)(OJ L 252/12 of 6 
October 2000).  Created on the basis of Article 63(2)(b) of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, the ERF is to allocate resources proportionately to the burden 
on each Member State by reason of their efforts in receiving refugees and displaced 
persons.  This Fund, which is jointly financed by the Member States, seeks to support 
special projects for the reception, integration and repatriation of refugees and 
displaced persons.  Despite its rather modest budget, in financial terms it is by far the 
largest EU programme on asylum and immigration.  Its rationale is ‘to demonstrate 
solidarity between Member States by achieving a balance in the efforts made by those 
Member States'.  The decision's text also explicitly states that 'it is fair to allocate 
[EU] resources proportionately to the burden on each Member State by reason of its 
efforts in receiving refugees and displaced persons.’13 
 
By 31 December 2004 (when its first funding cycle had come to an end), the ERF will 
had sought to distribute a total of Euro 216 million (i.e. ca. Euro 40 million per year) 
according to two elements, a fixed and a proportional one.  While the fixed element, is 
likely to have played an important role in getting overall agreement on the principle of 
the Fund (as every Member State did receive something from the Fund), it has been 
ineffective regarding the Fund’s 'balance of effort' objective.  If each Member State 
receives the same amount from this fixed element of the Fund, no progress in terms of 
burden-sharing will be made.  This appears to have been recognised as the Decision 
establishing the Fund prescribes a scaling down of this element over the Fund’s five 
year period.  It is often argued that in terms of the Fund’s solidarity objective, the 
fixed element has played an important role, as it has supported Member States with 
less developed protection systems irrespective of the number of displaced persons 
they received.  However, it of course has also supported Member States with well 
developed asylum systems and small numbers of protection seekers in equal measure.  
It hard to argue therefore that the Fund’s fixed element is an effective expression of 
Community solidarity.  If the objective of the Fund is to help particular Member 
States to develop their asylum institutions, then there must be better ways of doing 
this than by giving each Member State the same amount. 
 
                                                 
13  (OJ L 252/12 of 6 October 2000 (para 11).   16
Regarding the Fund's proportional element, it can be argued that the redistributive 
effect achieved here also remains sub-optimal.  Currently that part of the Fund is 
distributed on the basis of the absolute number of displaced persons received in a 
Member State.  This means that a particular number of protection seekers triggers the 
same amount of money through this mechanism irrespective of the receiving country 
concerned.  This has led to the result that countries with large absolute numbers have 
benefited disproportionately.  Relative to their population or size of GDP, or any other 
measure of absorption capacity, other countries have been faced with much greater 
relative burdens or responsibilities but have benefited less.  The underlying 
assumption regarding this allocation key appears to be that a particular number of 
protection seekers received, require the same amount of effort, no matter whether the 
receiving state is small or large, rich or poor, etc.  This is clearly not the case, as a 
certain number of protection seekers received will require greater efforts by a small 
country than a large one.  In other words, the Fund's redistributive element currently 
compensates Member States according to the absolute numbers of protection seekers 
received rather than according to the relative responsibilities or burdens that Member 
States are faced with.  From a solidarity or burden-sharing perspective this appears 
sub-optimal. 
 
Even if the Fund was distributing its resources in an optimal manner, its overall 
impact would still be rather limited, given its relatively small size.  According to UK 
home office estimates, Britain spent just under 30,000 Euro per asylum seeker in 
2002, if one includes administrative costs, legal bills, accommodation and 
subsistence.  According to figures from the Fund's mid-term review (DG Justice and 
Home Affairs 2003), the UK was the second largest recipient of the Fund in 2002, and 
received just over 100 Euro ERF money per asylum application received that year.  It 
therefore seems that the overall effect of the ERF during the first funding period was 
more important in symbolic terms, then in terms of its substantive effect in promoting 
a balance of efforts between the Member States.   
 
On 12 February 2004, the European Commission adopted a proposal for an extension 
of the ERF for the period 2005-2010.  The proposal was adopted in virtually   17
unchanged form by the Council in December 2004.
14  While the overall size of the 
Fund has been roughly tripled to a proposed EURO 684 million (pending the new 
budgetary perspective), the main principles underlying the Fund's allocation rules 
have virtually stayed unchanged.  According to Article 17 of the Decision, each 
Member State shall receive a fixed amount of EUR 300 000 from the Fund's annual 
allocation, with a special arrangement for the new Member States which will receive 
EUR 500 000 per annum for 2005, 2006 and 2007.  The principal shortcomings of the 
Funds allocation rules in terms of its redistributive capacity therefore remain.  Even 
with the substantial increase in the size of the Fund, revenues from the ERF are 
unlikely to significantly influence Member States' decisions as to the way they 
contribute to refugee protection.  The ERF therefore cannot be seen as an instrument 
that encourages specialisation in refugee protection measures. 
 
 
Sharing People 
The idea of ‘people sharing ’,i.e. the redistribution of protection seekers from one host 
territory to another on the basis of some measure of reception capacity, is a third 
method to address disparities in refugee burdens and also the most controversial one.  
Advocates of such policies argue that this is the only way to effectively equalize the 
costs incurred by host territories, as such measures capture not only costs linked to 
reception and determination but also those less quantifiable costs related to the 
integration of protection seekers.  Those who are opposed to such measures 
emphasize the risks to both the individual (related to a secondary uprooting) and to 
the new host territories, which might lack the social support networks of the 
protection seekers’ initial destination and which therefore might ultimately lead to 
higher total costs for the group of host countries operating such a scheme. 
 
In the EU, the first explicit references to physical burden-sharing ambitions were 
made by EU ministers responsible for asylum and immigration at their meeting of 30 
November and 1 December 1992 (not published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union (OJ)but reprinted in UNHCR 1995).  These deliberations led to a 
German Presidency Draft Council Resolution on Burden-sharing in July 1994 
                                                 
14 Council Decision of 2 December 2004 (2004/904/EC; OJ381/52 of 28/12/2004).   18
(Council Document 7773/94 ASIM 124).  This proposal foresaw the reception of 
refugees according to a key which was based on three criteria which were given equal 
weight (population size, size of Member State territory and GDP).  The form of the 
suggested redistributive mechanism followed the example of German domestic 
legislation, which stipulates a similar key for the distribution of asylum seekers 
among the German Länder.
15  The centrepiece of the German draft foresaw the 
introduction of a compulsory resettlement mechanism that relied on the above 
distributive key and reads as follows:  
 
Where the numbers admitted by a Member State exceed its indicative figure 
[...], other Member States which have not yet reached their indicative figure 
[...]will accept persons from the first State. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, this proposal did not find the necessary support in 
the Council.
6  In particular the UK, which had received a lot fewer asylum seekers 
than Germany until that point, was strongly opposed to such a scheme.
16  O t h e r  
Council members were opposed to this proposed ‘physical ’burden-sharing regime as 
they saw the transfer of displaced persons without their consent as a potential 
violation of those persons ’human rights.  Consensus among the Member States 
emerged only much later during the French Presidency for the much watered down 
Council resolution of 25 September 1995 ‘on burden-sharing with regard to the 
admission and residence of displaced persons on a temporary basis’ (OJ No C 262/1,7 
October 1995).  In it, no more mention is made of compulsory redistributive 
mechanism or indicative figures. Instead, it offers a number of ‘soft ’(i.e. non-
binding) principles to guide states in the event of a mass influx of protection seekers, 
including ‘the spirit of solidarity’, ‘equity of distribution’ and ‘harmonization of 
response’.  It takes account of British and French wishes, in recognizing that 
participation in peace-keeping operations can be counted against the admission of 
displaced persons when assessing the equity of burdens carried by individual Member 
States.  This non-binding resolution was complemented by a Council decision of 4 
March ‘on alert and emergency procedure on burden-sharing with regard to the 
                                                 
15  Ssee section 45 of the German Asylum Procedure Act (Asylverfahrensgesetz). 
16 See BMI (1994); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 27 January 1995:2; BT-Drs.13/1070, 55; 
Integrationsbericht, p.92).   19
admission and residence of displaced persons on a temporary basis’.
17  Together, 
these two decisions poured cold water on the idea of facilitating a quick and automatic 
burden-sharing response in the case of a mass influx of displaced persons. One has to 
agree with Suhrke, who states that ‘evidently, a voluntary and ad hoc commitment to 
share in the spirit of solidarity represented the limits of the possible’ (1998: 411).  The 
ineffectiveness of these instruments became evident during the Kosovo crisis when 
neither of the two instruments were called upon by the Member States. 
 
While these initiatives had limited concrete effects, other EU activities in this area 
such as the coming into force of the Dublin Convention had some quite paradoxical 
consequences on the distribution of burdens across the Member States.  The Dublin 
Convention, often regarded as the flagship of the EU’s asylum acquis, not only a 
affects individual asylum-seekers but also the protection responsibilities of each 
Member State.  The Dublin Convention provides the rule that the ‘Member State of 
first entry’ is the one responsible for dealing with a particular asylum claim. Asylum 
seekers who move to another Member State as a secondary movement can be send 
back to the ‘state of first entry’ (for an overview of the Dublin Convention see e.g. 
Hurwitz 1999).
18  Despite often being hailed as a responsibility sharing instrument, 
neither the Dublin Convention nor its successor ('Dublin II') should be regarded as an 
effective burden-sharing mechanism, as it merely shifts responsibility back to the 
geographically more exposed Member States.   
 
Other more recent EU initiatives based on the idea of people-sharing have been 
influenced not only by the recent experience with the refugee crises in Bosnia and 
Kosovo but also by people-sharing arrangements one finds in the refugee regimes of 
several Member States (Boswell 2003).  Particularly noteworthy in this context is the 
2001 Council Directive on Temporary Protection in the Case of Mass Influx (Council 
Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001,OJ L 212,7 August 2001).  As the Member 
States were unable to agree on a fixed distribution key for protection seekers, the 
directive develops a range of ultimately non-binding mechanisms based on the 
principle of ‘double voluntarism’ which means that the agreement of both the 
                                                 
17 Council Decision on an alert and emergency procedure for burden-sharing (4 March 1996), (OJ No 
L63/10,13 March 1996) and (96/198/JHA). 
18  For recent developments see also the Dublin II Regulation on the state responsible for examining an 
asylum application (L50/1 of 25.2.2003)   20
recipient state and the individuals concerned is required before protection seekers can 
be moved from one country to another.  Being fundamentally different from the 
original 1994 German proposals for a physical European refugee-sharing system 
(reprinted in UNHCR 1995), the effectiveness of such new methods of ‘soft ’co-
ordination and burden-sharing in this area still remains to be tested in practice.  
 
Overall this means that physical burden-sharing initiatives have encountered strong 
resistance and that measures that Member States have been able to agree on are 
unlikely to contribute significantly to a more equitable balance of efforts among the 
Member States.  From an implicit burden-sharing perspective, the British and French 
opposition of formal distribution scheme proposed by Germany could be seen in a 
more favorable light than has usually been done, as the German scheme might have 
discouraged specialization and led to a less efficient overall European refugee 
protection regime. 
 
Sharing Policy 
A third possible approach to achieve a more equitable distribution of burdens in this 
area is to take a common policy approach through either multilateral action or the 
harmonizing of domestic refugee legislation.  The 1951 Geneva Convention and its 
reference to inter-state solidarity can be seen as an example of the former, as can the 
1967 UN declaration on Territorial Asylum which stated that ‘where a State finds 
itself in difficulty in granting or continuing to grant asylum, states individually or 
jointly through the UN shall consider, in a spirit of international solidarity, 
appropriate measures to lighten the burden on that State ’(UN 1967: article 2.2).  The 
EU has worked towards the convergence of Member States’ laws on forced migration 
since the mid 1980s.  What started with initially non-binding intergovernmental 
instruments has since then been followed by developments in Community law. 
Important steps have been the 1995 Resolution on Minimum Guarantees for Asylum 
Procedures (Council Resolution of 20 June 1995,OJ C 274), the 1999 Amsterdam 
Treaty establishing a Common European Asylum System (for an overview see Guild 
and Harlow 2001), the 2002 political agreement at the Brussels JHA Council 
regarding a common definition for persons eligible for refugee and subsidiary 
protection status, the 2003 directive on common reception conditions (OJ 
L/2003/31/18), the September 2003 Directive on family reunification (OJ L 251 of   21
03.10.2003), the Dublin II Regulation (L50/1 of 25.2.2003) and the recent 
commitments made in the November 2004 Hague Programme (COM(2005)184 final). 
 
Policy harmonization can of course only address imbalances which are due to 
differences in domestic legislation in the first place.  It has become increasingly 
accepted that policy differences are only one of several determinants for a protection 
seeker’s choice of host country, with other structural factors such as historic networks, 
employment opportunities and a host country’s reputation being equally, if not more, 
important (Thielemann forthcoming).  If structural pull factors are indeed so 
important, then policy harmonization might do more harm than good in the EU's 
attempt to achieve a more equitable distribution of asylum seekers across the Member 
States.  Not only do harmonized policies mean that inequalities due to structural 
factors will remain.  More importantly, policy harmonization curtails states' ability to 
use decisions on the relative restrictiveness or openness of their asylum policies to 
choose their country's most efficient mix of reactive and proactive contributions to 
refugee protection.  Like some of the other formal EU burden-sharing initiatives 
discussed above, policy harmonization is therefore more likely to undermine than to 
facilitate opportunities for implicit burden-sharing in this area. 
 
The implicit burden-sharing model outlined above potentially has important 
implications for our assessment of the quality of refugee protection currently 
provided.  It can be argued that the provision of this collective good is closer to 
optimality when countries are allowed to specialize with regard to their contributions.  
Moreover, evidence of inter-country specialisation also suggests that refugee 
provision is perhaps not as inequitable as often assumed by those who examine 
countries’ willingness to accept displaced persons on its own.  Recognising the 
existence of country-specific benefits from refugee protection and the possibility of 
specialisation in states' contributions can both help to raise the efficiency of refugee 
protection efforts.   
 
It is possible that burden-sharing initiatives that attempt to force all nations to increase 
contributions in a particular category of provision are likely to be counterproductive 
for the efficient provision of collective goods.  Recent European initiatives to 
harmonise Member States’ asylum policies and recent proposals for formal burden-  22
sharing criteria in this area, are not only politically highly divisive but may also be 
questionable with respect to efficiency considerations.  Burden-sharing initiatives, if 
they are to strengthen refugee protection, need to be aware of variations in states' 
preferences in this area and need to recognise comparative advantages possessed by 
individual states.  If they do not, they risk to undermine the search for more effective 
refugee protection efforts.  
 
Conclusions 
 
We have looked at the area of international refugee protection in light of theories of 
public goods provision in international alliances. We have suggested that the area of 
international refugee protection can be broken down into two components. Proactive 
contributions consist of contributions made at source, involving the sending of 
peacekeepers to international areas of crisis. Reactive contributions involve the 
acceptance of asylum-seekers fleeing from such areas of international crisis. The 
literature on peacekeeping contributions offers strong support for the  hypothesis of 
exploitation of the large by the small.  With the larger countries bearing a dis-
proportionally large share of the peacekeeping burden.  On the basis of the evidence 
presented here, no such exploitation exists with regard to reactive refugee burdens. If 
anything, it is the smaller countries which bear a larger share of the responsibilities of 
accepting refugees.  It is tempting on the basis of this evidence to suggest that larger 
countries should be contributing more in this area. As we have shown, the general 
thrust of recent European policy initiatives appear to have this aim in mind.  However, 
the analysis presented here suggests a note of caution. Amongst the drawbacks of any 
attempts to harmonise policy in this area is the possibility that any increase in a 
country’s contribution to receiving refugees is matched by a reduction in its 
contribution to peacekeeping. If Boyer’s arguments can be applied to this area, and 
we believe that they can,  the imposition of quotas and suchlike should be seen as a 
hindrance toward greater specialisation and trade, with adverse overall effects. This is 
of course a very tentative conclusion, but one which at the very least calls for more 
empirical work on the relationship between peacekeeping commitments and asylum 
policy and the implicit trade of states’ contributions to international public goods 
more generally.   23
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